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Abstract
This paper evaluates how “tough on crime” sentencing policies have influenced California's prison population.
Several laws which make up the state's strict criminal justice practices were passed over the course of forty
years without consideration for their impact on the state's budget and safety. Beginning with the Uniform
Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, the state has created an unsustainable prison system that will dissolve
without increased public funding. However, California’s depleted economic condition has forced
policymakers to reevaluate the state's criminal justice agenda, while complying with the three- judge court
order to reduce its incarcerated population to 137.5 percent of design capacity by June 2013.
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This paper evaluates how “tough on crime” sentencing 
policies have influenced California's prison population.  Several 
laws which make up the state's strict criminal justice practices 
were passed over the course of forty years without consideration 
for their impact on the state's budget and safety.  Beginning with 
the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, the state has 
created an unsustainable prison system that will dissolve without 
increased public funding.  However, California’s depleted 
economic condition has forced policymakers to reevaluate the 
state's criminal justice agenda, while complying with the three-
judge court order to reduce its incarcerated population to 137.5 
percent of design capacity by June 2013. 
 
Reducing California's Overcrowded Prison Population 
According to the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR) (2010), California's recidivism rate for 
2005 was 67.5 percent, indicating that over 73,000 inmates were 
re-incarcerated within three years of release from prison. In 
comparison, the national three-year recidivism rate was 43.3 
percent for inmates released from state prisons in 2004 (PEW 
Center on the States, 2011, p. 11).  Recidivism is based on the 
number of offenders who reengage in criminal activity despite 
previous punishment, and it is measured on re-arrests, additional 
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convictions, and technical violations of conditional release. 
 Nearly forty years of “tough on crime” rhetoric has caused 
California to lose control of its correctional system, and the 
problems facing the state can no longer be solved with increased 
public funds (Little Hoover Commission, 2007).  In 2006, when 
California's prison population was at about 160,000 inmates, the 
levels of overcrowding in California's prisons were deemed cruel 
and unusual punishment under the controversial 5-to-4 United 
States Supreme Court decision in the case of Brown, Governor 
of California et. al v Plata et. al (Plata) (Rogan, 2012).  Under 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the US Supreme Court 
upheld the decision of a three-judge court, which ordered 
California to decrease its prison population to 137.5 percent of 
design capacity by June 2013 (California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2011).  Although the design 
capacity of the CDCR is 83,219, the court order would require 
the state's prison population to drop from the current estimate of 
144,000 to approximately 110,000 inmates (Little Hoover 
Commission, 2007, p. 19).  With failed “tough on crime” 
policies still in place, California cannot meet the court mandate.  
California's failed criminal justice policies include 
determinate sentencing, which encompasses confinement 
sentences that have fixed or minimum durations depending on 
the crime committed.  Determinate sentencing limits both 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion in regard to charging and 
sentencing respectively; as a result, more people are being 
convicted with mandatory minimum prison terms.  The varying 
availability of correctional resources prevents determinate 
sentencing from accomplishing its goal of sentencing uniformity. 
 Due to mandatory minimum prison terms, law violators who 
would have been effectively reprimanded without incarceration 
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are sentenced to the state's most costly and most often prescribed 
method of punishment. The punishment does not fit the crime. 
Each inmate costs over $45,000 per year to be detained within 
the state prison system (California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation, 2011).  Nevertheless, “tough on crime” 
rhetoric and the policies it has produced have reduced the 
availability of less costly options at the local level.  The 
California corrections budget is primarily used for detaining 
inmates, rather than providing rehabilitation opportunities in 
order to empower prisoners to escape the revolving door of the 
state's prisons.  California must implement evidence-based crime 
prevention recommendations to establish a long-term process for 
reducing the state's incarcerated population, therefore enhancing 
public safety and protecting limited public resources. 
 
Empirical and Theoretical Evidence 
When California passed the necessary criminal justice 
reforms to transform the state's indeterminate sentencing 
practices into determinate sentencing policies in the late 1970s, 
politicians promoted the new sentencing provisions as the 
solution to decrease crime.  According to Vitiello and Kelso, 
(2004), “Despite compelling evidence to the contrary…ardent 
belief has prevailed over empirical analysis” (p. 908).  Thirty-
five years after California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act 
went into effect, inmates discharged from an indeterminate 
sentence recidivated at a rate much lower (12.8 percent) than 
those who served a determinate sentence (65.1 percent) 
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2011, 
p. 27).  However, lawmakers continue to formulate hard-on-
crime policies in hopes of securing voter support by exploiting 
the public's fear during election years.  Based on the findings 
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from Krieger's (2011) evaluation of four California state 
elections during 1992 to 2000, there is no evidence to support the 
myth amongst legislators that voters support politicians with 
stringent criminal justice agendas over so-called “soft on crime” 
candidates.  California Governor Jerry Brown, who had 
originally signed determinate sentencing into law in 1976, called 
the policy “an 'abysmal failure'” (Warren, 2003).  To alleviate 
California's prison overcrowding, costs, and recidivism, 
Assembly Bill (AB) 109 and AB 117 went into effect on October 
1, 2011.  The legislation aims to achieve the court-ordered 
inmate population reductions, despite mandating that all 
prisoners currently in state prison will serve their entire sentence. 
 Some California inmates have been relocated to out-of-state 
prison facilities to relieve overcrowding; this practice can be 
harmful for offenders with social support and family within local 
communities. Moreover, the Assembly Bills seem to transfer the 
problems of the state prison system to county jails or out-of-state 
prisons, but the effects of the Public Safety Realignment will not 
be wholly understood until its entire implementation is achieved 
in 2015 (California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation, 2011).  The California Governor and Legislature 
must move past “tough on crime” rhetoric and implement new 
evidence-based policies to be “smart on crime.”  
Even with political will from some California lawmakers, 
attempts to amend the state's broken correctional system have 
been thwarted by lobbying organizations such as the California 
Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA).  The 
CCPOA is a powerfully influential union for prison guards in 
California that annually collects approximately $21.9 million 
from its 31,000 members (Cavanaugh, 2011).  Although the 
CCPOA recognizes a need for change due to prison 
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overcrowding, the group has opposed all serious state sentence 
reforms despite the threat that crowded prisons pose to the 
guards (Cavanaugh, 2011, p. 94).  In 2004, Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger attempted to put a new parole model into 
fruition, hoping to expand the availability of community and 
locally based punishment alternatives, but the CCPOA aired 
television advertisements accusing the new reforms of putting 
the public at risk.  More specifically, the advertisements 
indicated that the changes would keep “'murders, rapists and 
child molesters on [the] streets'” (Little Hoover Commission, 
2007, p. 3). In reality, the parole reforms were intended for low-
level parole violators and were estimated to save the state 
approximately $150 million over two years (Little Hoover 
Commission, 2007). The CCPOA's opposition to sentencing 
alternatives will make it more difficult for California to meet the 
state's court-mandated prison population reduction of up to 
46,000 offenders within two years (Rogan, 2012). The union's 
malicious campaign against political initiatives to reduce the 
state's prison population is detrimental. The CCPOA has an 
indirect influence on the state's criminal justice policies, 
including California's infamous three-strikes policy amongst 
other current, strict sentencing laws. 
In 1994, California passed the “Three Strikes and You're 
Out” law.  The three-strikes ballot initiative, also known as 
Proposition 184, doubled the penalty for any second felony if the 
first offense was serious or violent in nature.  Also under the 
three-strikes statute, an offender is subject to a mandatory 
minimum prison sentence of 25 years to life for a third felony 
conviction, if previously convicted of a serious felony.  A similar 
three-strikes bill proposed by Assemblyman Richard Rainy 
would have saved the state billions because it “required the third 
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strike to be a violent or serious felony (excluding burglary)” 
(Krieger, 2011, p. 150). By the end of 2010, “California prisons 
held 32,271 Second Strikers, and 8,727 Third Strikers (40,998 
inmates total)” (California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation, 2011, p. 24).  Rainy's three-strikes initiative 
would have reduced the duration of incarceration for about 19 
percent of the third-striker population who were convicted of 
drug crimes (California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation, 2011). In 2012, California passed Proposition 36 
to amend its three-strikes law to reduce prison costs and 
sentences for some third strikers with current offenses that are 
not serious and non-violent felonies, as well as resentencing 
some third strikers serving life sentences for non-serious, non-
violent felonies (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2012). Proposition 
36 fails to address the real problem that is the very three-strikes 
law it alters, but the implementation of the law is too recent for 
its effects to be entirely understood.  
Although Proposition 36 is progress, it addresses the plight 
of third strikers while ignoring the excessive punitive 
consequences inflicted on the second-striker population. 
Thinking long-term, it would be more beneficial for society if 
drug abusers entered treatment programs instead of prison cells. 
 California's three-strikes law treats all offenders alike; the 
legislation represents a series of sentencing policies that fail to 
take a comprehensive approach to the use of prison space. 
 Although the three-strikes statute aims to deter criminals while 
incapacitating repeat offenders, the findings of the Justice Policy 
Institute (1999) reveal that California's three-strikes policy has 
had no measurable impact concerning deterrence and selective 
incapacitation on the legislation's targeted population. Cesare 
Beccaria, the father of classical criminal theory, believed that 
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punishment was necessary to deter people from violating the law 
(Conklin, 2010).  However, Beccaria concluded that it was 
critical that the punishment fit the crime because too 
insignificant of a punishment can be harmful to society by 
encouraging crime, while too harsh of a punishment can 
perpetuate disregard for the law.  
In California, law violators are incarcerated with the intent to 
remove the threat of victimization they pose to law-abiding 
citizens.  Incapacitation as the focus of penology has “reduce[d] 
the effects of crime in society not by altering either offender or 
social context, but by rearranging the distribution of offenders in 
society in such a way that probabilities and risks are altered in 
the general population” (Auerhahn, 1999, p. 705). However, 
determinate sentencing release is certain, but success upon 
release is unlikely when offenders have no incentives to improve 
themselves while imprisoned. About 40,000 of an estimated 
144,000 inmates in California's state prison have benefitted from 
an academic or vocational program (California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2011). Due to prisoner apathy or 
a lack of correctional resources to accommodate interested 
inmates, 104,000 offenders are in prison waiting for release 
without the skills to maintain a legitimate lifestyle.  The 
government reports analyzed by Piotrowski and Lathrop (2012) 
revealed that “without access to prison-based programs the 
standard rates for recidivism would range between 60-70 
percent” (p. 686).  Even with limited access to programs in 
Californian prisons, the state has a recidivism rate fluctuating 
between 60-70 percent.  
Offenders without access to prisoner programs are hindered 
from assimilating back into society.  In-prison educational and 
literacy programs have had a “substantial positive impact in 
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reducing recidivism” (Piotrowski & Lathrop, 2012, p. 686).  In-
prison vocational programs are  effective moderately when an 
inmate's needs and skills are matched with a particular program 
type (Piotrowski & Lathrop, 2012).  Ex-convicts have more 
trouble securing a legitimate occupation than law-abiding 
citizens due to poor employment records and their criminal 
history, but some community-based job training programs cost 
less than $500 per individual while reducing the likelihood of 
recidivism by 4.6 percent (Bushway & Apel, 2012). Although 
approximately two-thirds of inmates in California seriously need 
drug treatment, only 2 percent receive professional treatment 
during incarceration, and aftercare funding is only available for 
half of those offenders (Little Hoover Commission, 2007). Post-
release drug programs are proven to reduce recidivism rates and 
enhance employability because of the high association between 
drug use and criminal activity (Little Hoover Commission, 
2007).  In 1997, 33 percent of state prisoners indicated that they 
had been under the influence of an illegal substance when 
arrested for the offense for which they were imprisoned 
(Conklin, 2010).  At the very least, the state should offer 
prisoners information about services and opportunities in local 
communities before release to ensure offenders reenter society 
successfully.  Without advancement of education and job skills 
and treatment for substance abuse, desistance from crime is 
improbable.  
With such high recidivism rates in the state, California tax 
payers should wonder how public funds are spent and if the 
money is distributed appropriately.  For the 2012-2013 fiscal 
year, the CDCR received almost $11 billion to continue 
warehousing prisoners within state facilities; corrections 
accounts for 7.8 percent of California's state budget (Brown, 
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2012).  Second and third strikers comprise about 42,000 of 
California’s total prison population of approximately 144,000 
offenders (CDCR, 2011). In other words, considering CDCR 
estimates that each inmate costs the state over $45,000 per year, 
nearly $1.9 billion of California’s 2011-2012 correctional budget 
of $11 billion is allocated for the selective incapacitation of 
repeat offenders (CDCR, 2012; CDCR, 2013). Spelman (2000) 
admits that there is an initial link between lower crime rates and 
increased prison capacity, but the relationship is so marginal that 
the warehousing of prisoners simply is not cost-effective, and 
over time, the benefits of incapacitation have a diminished 
effect. Rosenfeld (2000) elaborates on the cost effectiveness of 
mass incarceration: The inmate population had to increase by 
670 individuals in the 1990s at an expenditure of $20,000 per 
inmate for a total of $13.4 million to prevent a single homicide. 
While mandatory sentences and incapacitation guarantees 
chronic offenders will not commit crimes while incarcerated, the 
monetary cost is high, considering release is imminent. 
In contrast, only $400 million of the $11 billion were granted 
to programs known to reduce rates of recidivism, such as adult 
activities, educational, vocational, and substance abuse programs 
(Brown, 2012). “Tough on crime” agendas are tough on 
taxpayers. From 2002-2007, the CDCR budget increased by 52 
percent; however, there are no more public funds to relinquish 
prison system problems frivolously (Little Hoover Commission, 
2007). California's costly correctional system financially affects 
every other state government program, including education, 
health care, and public transportation. The recent economic 
hardships affecting California's budget provides an opportunity 
to reevaluate failed policies.  Of the 149,976 offenders to depart 
from state prison in 2010, 119,941 were paroled, and only 2,537 
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of the felons were discharged without conditional release 
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2011). 
 More than 50 percent of offenders in California who return to 
prison are re-incarcerated due to parole violations, which include 
missing parole appointments, consuming alcohol, and other 
noncriminal behavior for the ordinary citizen (Fischer, 2005). 
The CDCR should allocate post-release supervision resources 
based on factors that influence recidivism risk, such as age, 
gender, education level, employability, social support, religious 
affiliation, substance abuse, and mental health. The most 
resources should be applied to repeat-offenders with high 
recidivism risks, and little to no supervision should be given for 
non-serious offenders least likely to re-offend.  The CDCR must 
redirect prison-warehousing funds to evidence-based 
recommendations for greater agency efficacy.  
 
Evidence-based Recommendations 
California must learn from its failed experiment with “tough 
on crime” policies, and evaluate the fiscal appropriations and 
resources necessary for sentencing laws before implementation 
of similar legislation in the future. Voters should be provided 
with the necessary policy evaluations to make informed 
decisions. If the California governor and legislature cannot act 
immediately to mitigate California's prison crisis adequately, a 
non-political sentencing commission must be established. The 
sentencing commission would be accountable for the impact of 
its sentencing laws and relies on evidence-based research to best 
allocate resources. Indeterminate sentencing practices should be 
adopted to allow for prosecutorial and judicial discretion when 
there are special circumstances. With indeterminate sentencing, 
offenders will have motivation to complete in-prison programs 
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by increasing their likelihood of early release. Reentry programs 
furthering the educational and vocational skills of offenders 
should be court mandated before release, and treatment programs 
must be required when necessary. The CDCR should form state-
agency partnerships to combine limited public resources, thus 
enabling offenders to assimilate back into society successfully. 
Of the $11 billion corrections budget, more funds should be 
redirected to locally based punishment alternatives for the 
purpose of increasing local jail capacity, expanding probation 
opportunities, enforcing electronic monitoring, and creating day- 
reporting and aftercare drug treatment centers. Non-criminal 
parole revocations should not lead to time served in prison. 
Furthermore, parole supervision should only be used when an 
offender has a high risk to recidivate. California needs to adjust 
its distribution of correctional resources to guide offenders away 
from the prison entrance.  
 
Conclusion 
California must change its correctional policies to establish a 
sustainable state prison system founded on evidence-based 
research proven to reduce the inmate population, improve public 
safety, and preserve public resources. To stop the revolving 
prison door, correctional reform must overcome politics. The 
high rate of offenders returning to prison underscores the need 
for California to implement strategies guaranteed to effect crime 
prevention, while simultaneously holding offenders accountable 
for their actions and self-improvement. The reevaluation of the 
state's failed policies was initiated by the three-judge court, but 
change is long overdue. California has neither the budget nor the 
time to build more prison facilities; immediate and long-term 
reforms are necessary for the state to comply with the court's 
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decision and prevent future court intervention. However, public 
and elected officials must endorse the permanent and effective 
changes California direly needs before the state can regain 
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